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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
CHARLES B. PETTY, MAGGIE C.
PETTY, RACHEL P. LUNT,
NORMA P. STRASSER, UTAHNA
P. BELNAP, LEILA P. SHIPP,
NEUMAN C. PETTY, JOHN K.
RUSSELL, Trustee, and HOW ARD
0. MILLER, Trustee, Partners of
PETTY INVESTMENT COMPANY,
a partnership doing business in the
State of Utah,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
GINDY MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.

10274

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action of promissory estoppel by the
above-named partners of a finance and investment
firm doing business in Utah as Petty Investment
Company (R. 38) against Gindy Manufacturing
C(Jrporation, a Pennsylvania Corporation to recover
a monry judgment originally in the sum of $13,000.00, interest and costs.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The ~as: was ~ried t~ th_e court. ~rom a judg.
ment of d1sm1ssal with preJud1ce of Plamtiff's action
the Plaintiffs appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the decree dismissing with prejudice the Plaintif's causes of action
and a decree of this Honorable Court of judgment'
for the Plaintiff against the Defendant, or failing
in that an order of this Honorable Court for a new
trial of the case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff's action was begun on June 21, 1963
by service of summons upon one, G. H. Mickelson
as Defendant's agent, the so-called Defendant's "Dis·
tributor" of Gindy Trailers. On the same day the
sheriff of Salt Lake County, Utah attached a trailer
manufactured and owned by Defendant Gindy Manufacturing Company and in the possession of the socalled "Distributor" or his personally owned corpo·
ration, Freeway Trailer Sales, Inc., as a demon·
strator.
A special appearance and motion to quash the
service of summons was made by the Defendant.
Upon pre-trial hearing the motion to quash the s.erv·
ice of summons was granted and the Court retamed
jurisdiction of the said trailer, Model C240V9. (R.

38.)
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On May 22, 1963 after due proceedings under
Rule 64 C (f) an order was entered releasing said
trailer from attachment upon Defendant having filed
with the Court a corporate undertaking of Fireman's
Insurance Company in the amount of fifty-five hundred ($5,500.00) dollars (R. 48).
Therefore according to the proceedings in the
trial court the action is now an in rem action, and
the Plaintiff's position is that it is an action based
upon the modern doctrine of promissory estoppel.
The material facts are stated, it is believed,
objectively. Plaintiffs have not, however, viewed the
facts favorably to the findings of the trial court
which viewed the pleadings merely as stating an action of deceit and in the alternative of a legal conditional contract.
The material facts are stated as a court of equity
iB free to weigh the evidence in the light of an equitable action of promissory estoppel.
Meuning and Use of Words and Phrases

The surname Petty as used herein will mean
Charles B. Petty in his capacity as agent and managing partner for the Plaintiffs doing business as
Petty Investment Company. (R. 91, 12-15.)
The name Gindy will be used to mean Gindy
Manufacturing Corporation, a Pennsylvania Corporation, the Defendant.
The surname Mickelson will be used herein to
indicate Glen H. Mickelson in his capacity as Presi-
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dent, and managing agent of Freeway Trailer Sales
Inc., a Utah corporation (R. 88) of which he wa~
principal stockholder (R. 30) until its charter was
suspended on October 14, 1963 for failure to pay
corporate tax (Ex. 3). When the name Mickelson
is used to apply in his individual capacity or as principle stockholder, manager and agent of one of his
other corporations, namely, Intermountain Leasing
Corporation, special mention of such fact will be
given. ( R. 30.)
The phrase Freeway Sales will be used to indicate Mickelson's corporation, Freeway Trailer Sales,
Inc. which has lost its franchise (Ex. 3) and has no
assets ( R. 48, 24-26).
(a) The Factual Requirements of Promissory
Estoppel
The multiplicity and complexity of factual requirements of an action of promissory estoppel indicate that a mere chronological statement of facts will
not be most helpful. Clarity, it seems, will be greatly
aided by grouping the material fact situations under
group headings which have evolved in drawing the
lines of demarcation between, situations where legal
rules of contract should be applied, and the fact situations which fulfill the requirements of an action
of promissory estoppel - "a contract in the eye of
equity."
The factual requirements for this relatively new
contract cause of action have developed very rapidly
since the masterful statement of Section 90 of the
Restatement of Contracts about 34 years ago, under
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the heading "Informal contracts without Assent or
Consideration."
The facts generally must be fitted into said
section 90 which reads :
A promise which the promissor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does
induce such action or forbearance is binding
if injustice can be avoided only by the enforcement of the promise.
By June, 1941 there were at least 46 appellate
decisions interpreting Section 90. ( 114 Ill. L. R. 187204, 190.) In classifying the facts in this case, counsel will seek to assemble the facts in groupings as
follows:
First, the special facts of the case other than
those in the Milne and the first Interstate so-called
orders for Gindy semi-trailers, claimed by Gindy to
be discovered to be fraudulent or forged. In this
group, facts will be examined to determine whether
Mickelson, personally acted as an independent contractor of Gindy, or whether by continuous course
of dealing Freeway sales became and acted as the
soliciting agent of Gindy.
This first group of facts rests on the principle
declared in Ravino v. Price ( 1953) 123 Utah 559,
570, 260 P. 2d 270 and emphasized in Easton v. Wycoff (1956) 4 Utah 2d 368, 389, 295 P. 2d 332, as
controlling.
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The quote from the Rrrvino case is as follows:

Application of the rules of equitable enforcement must to a considerable extent be
governed by the circumstances of each case.
( 570.)
Second, the additional facts will be grouped un- '
der one of the six factual requirements summarized
as essential for an action of promissory estoppel coming within the general terms of section 90 of the
Restatement, supra. These respective groups of facts
are stated by Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 5th ed.
1941, Vol. 3, Secs. 805 as follows:

1. There must be conduct - acts, Ian- ,
guage, or silence - amounting to a representation or concealment of a material fact.
2. The facts must be known to the party
estopped at the time of his said conduct, or at
least the circumstances must be such that
knowledge of them is necessarily imputed to
him. (Exception Sec. 809.)
3. The truth concerning these facts must
be unknown to the other party claiming the
benefit of the estoppel, at the time when sue~
conduct was done, and at the time when 11
was acted upon by him.
4. The conduct must be done with t~e
intention or at least the expectation, that it
will be a~ted upon by the ot~e~ party, or und.e 1;
such circumstances that it is both natma
and probable that it will be so acted upon.
5. The conduct must be relied upon by
the other party, and thus relying he must be
led to act upon it.
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6. He must in fact act upon it in such a
manner as to change his position for the
worse; in other words, he must so act that
he would suffer a loss if he were compelled
to surrender or forego or alter what he has
done by reason of the first party being permitted to repudiate his conduct and to assert
rights in consistent with it.
It will be seen that fraud is not given as
an essential requisite in the foregoing statement. It is not absolutely necessary that the
conduct mentioned in the first subdivision
should be done with an actual and fraudulent
intention of deceiving the other party; nor is
this meaning implied by any of the language
which I have used.
Third, this final grouping of facts will cover
the alleged so-called orders, by which Gindy claims
to be defrauded by its agent Freeway Sales into believing it had genuine orders and therefore innocently misrepresented to plaintiffs that the Milne and
first Interstate orders were thought by Gindy to be
genuine. The facts in these two supposed orders
raises the question of which of two innocent parties
must suffer the loss.
(b) The Background "Circumstances of This

Case."

Plaintiffs through Petty as the managing partner of Petty Investment Company (R. 91, 12) made
a first loan to Mickelson of $24,000 on May 31, 1961
(R. 93) due in 60 days ( R. 94). Apparently the first
note was paid by a later note to Plaintiffs which
increased the amount loaned to $35,000, also due
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in '61 in 60 days after date ( R. 94). In answering
whether the second note was to Mickelson personallv
or to his corporation Freeway Sales, Petty answered,:
A. Well they are so closely interrelated
A. I think it was Freeway (R. 94).
The second loan was only partly repaid apparently $19,400 remained over-due on September 28,
1962 ( R. 94) . A second mortgage had been given
to secure the second note. In attempting to collect
the second note it was discovered that the mortgage
description was on ground owned by others and
Plaintiffs "were obliged to release it." (R. 95.)
This was the strained situation when on the
morning of September 28, 1962 Mr. Mickelson came
to Petty with an offer of assignment of "commis·
sions coming" ( R. 97) .
Mr. Mickelson orally represented to Mr. Petty
that Freeway Trailer Sales Inc. wanted to borrow
$12,000. That it had commissions due and coming
due of $44,300 on orders held by Gindy which Freeway Trailer Sales, Inc. would warrant to be genuine
(Ex. 5) ( R. 97). Mr. Petty refused to rely on Mickelson's representations. Plaintiffs w o u I d loan
$12, 000 of new credit (a) only if Plaintiffs would
definitely receive that amount plus another $5,000
on the old past-due debt from Gindy direct and. (b)
only if Gindy would represent to Plaintiffs di'.·ect
that it had orders from Freeway Sales and/or Mick·
elson on September 28, 1962 out of which the $17,000

1

1

1
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would be paid by Gintly to Petty Investment Company ( R. 97).
Petty testified that he then sent a telegram to
Gindy inquiring if he could rely on payment of
$17,000 if he made a further loan to Freeway Traile1· Sales, Inc. ( R. 99) .
At this time Petty did not know whether Gindy
had the orders represented by Mickelson, and second
whether the fact was that the orders were genuine
for at least $17,000 of commissions to Freeway Sales
and/or Mickelson. Petty's lack of knowledge was the
same when two days later, on Monday morning
September 30 the $12,000 of new loan to Freeway
Trailer Sales, Inc. as payee was made. (Ex. 4) This
is the factual requirement of promissory estoppel
numbered 3 by Pomeroy, supra, p. 191.
Factual Relations of Gindy and Mickelson Personnl/y ond Freeway Sales By Continuous Course of
Dealing
Prior to September 28, 1962, namely on March
1, 1962, Mickelson and Gindy mutually executed
what was designated as a ''DISTRIBUTOR" contract (Ex. 2). However Gindy allowed only one abortive attempt by Mickelson to purport to buy a Gindy
:'emi-trailer for resale, ( R. 128) to be hereafter described. All of the orders and so-called orders (Ex.
6 & 7) read on page 2 thereof "Sold by Freeway
Trailer Sales, Inc." except No. 3903, the Earl Morrison order, which reads, "Sold by G. H. Mickelson
(Freeway Trailer) (Ex. 6).
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The testimony on the meaning of Mickelson'i
personal signature on Exhibit 2 shows his intention
at the time of signing the same.
is?

Q. Will you state what that document

A. It is a dealer's agreement between
Gindy Manufacturing and Freeway Trailer
Sales (R. 87, 7-9).
Correspondence in evidence is between Fref'way Sales and Gindy not with Mickelson personally
(Ex. 7 p. 1, Letter July 1, 1962, information of possible customer for Gindy, that Pacific & Atlantic
Shippers, a division of P. I. E. are in the market for
"250" trailers for their Piggy-back operation and
suggesting sample semi-trailer be leased at $100 per
month.)
When Mickelson advertised Gindy semi-trailers
in the yellow pages of the 1962 telephone book
he had the ad read: "WHERE TO BUY THEM"
Freeway Trailer Sales, Inc., 2110 S. 3 W. - HU 4-

8711.

The assignment of commissions of $44,300 to
Petty Investment Company is by Freeway Trailer
Sales, Inc. addressed to Gindy Sept. 28, 1962 (Ex. 5).

The check of Petty Investment Company corering the new loan of $12,000 dated 9/30/1962 is to
Freeway Trailer Sales, Inc. as payee.
The telegram from Gindy to Plaintiffs represent orders held from Freeway and/or G. H. Mickel·
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son presently to produce in the future more than
$17,000.
The f Ol'egoing facts compel the inference of
fact that Mickelson did not act as distributor - an
independent contractor buying Gindy semi-trailers
for resale - but that Freeway Sales was the soliciting agent for Gindy at all times from March 1962
to September 30, 1962 by a continuous course of
dealing to act for Gindy as follows:
(1) To solicit customers investigating semitrailers. (Ex. 7, p. 1, Letter.)
( 2) To solicit prospective customers' names
and their negotiating specifications for probable later
order of Gindy Trailers; (Ex. 6, No. 3902, Peebles,
Pillsbury neither cash or time price shown (R. 115121). To be financed at Bank of America in Los
Angeles ( R. 119).
( 3) To solicit orders for cash (Ex. 6, No. 3903,
Morrison) or for cash and exchange of used trailers
(Ex. 6, No. 3909, Interstate Motor Lines 20-40 ft.
trailers, and,
( 4) To solicit conditional offers for the leasing

of Gindy trailers conditioned on agreement of satis-

factory financing of prospective customers by Gindy
or usually by a bank approved by Gindy (Robert
.J. Orr, Intermountain Leasing Corp.) Ex. 6, No.
8900, to be financed at Bank of America (R. 132).
( d) Gindy' s Special order Method of Operation
knd Petty's State of Mind
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Unknown to Plaintiff's Gindy did not conduct
its business through Freeway Trailer Sales, Inc. hv 1
having its agent secure orders for stock semi-trailei·; ,
such as are shown on the last two pages of Exhibit
7 - "PIGGY-BACK TRAILERS FOR NATIONAL CARLOADING CORP. SPECIFICATIONS." '
Mr. Stanley Walters, Jr., the treasurer of Gin<ly
(R. 28) apparently was manager of Gindy, subject
to constant checking with Mr. Ginsburg, the "owner '
of Gindy'' (R. 109). Among Mr. Walter's many
duties was to price out the 40 odd specifications
designated by a prospective customer on the negotiating specifications of so-called Gindy orders (Ex.
6) which contained the name of the prospective customer. Only after this was done, and only after the
prospective customer had been informed of and had
agreed to Gindy's offer of the cash price or the time 1
price while he was free to shop around in a highly
competitive market for Freuhauf or Williamson or
many other trailers (see yellow page advertisement,
R. 29) was a firm order had by Gindy. It was also )
one of Mr. Walter's duties to check the credit of prospective customers and to negotiate for financing,
another condition precedent before a time price order 1
was had by Gindy (R. 119 & 116). It was also Mr.
Walter's duty to negotiate lease arrangements, on '
so-called orders where only the specifications occurred and the prospective customer had not signed.
(R. 131, 26.)
1

.i

1

Mr. Walters testified:
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. We do not build stock trailers. We
build customer trailers to customer specifications and quite often at the time the order is
signed it is not possible to determine the price
(R. 129, 6-9).
Because of the way in which Gindy operated,
different than the selling of stock automobiles or
trncks, he used the word orders in a different sense
than the vehicular industry understands its meaning.

In this regard the damaging admission of Mr.
Walters appears as follows:
Q. When you said "commissions?"
A. When I said "on deals in or pending?" (Italics added.)
Q. Which did you say deals in or pending?
A. I don't remember which word I used
now....
Q. No difference in your mind between
orders or deals?
A. I might use the word interchangeably.
These facts fulfill Pomeroy's requirement numbered 2, supra. Gindy knew, or the circumstances
were such that knowledge was imputed to Gindy
(except on the fictitious Milne and 1st Interstate
orders) that Gindy did not have orders from Freeway Sales and/or Mickelson which would more than
cover $17,000 as stated in Walter's telegram to
Petty Investment Company on September 28, 1962
(Ex. 1).
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Petty Familiar With the Word "Order" and Phrase
"Deals in Process"
It is a historical fact widely advertised, of which
we presume the Court will take judicial notice that
Mr. Charles B. Petty is interested in Petty Motor
Company or Petty-Ford (R. 92) which is the oldest
Ford franchised dealer in Utah, and that Petty Ford
sells stock cars of which there are several models of
Ford cars. The dealers allow customers to make specifications of horsepower of engine, kind of transmission, and a number of lesser specifications like
tinted glass and whitewall tires which must be
priced before an offer is had.
In refusing to rely on Mickelson's representations as manager of Trailer Sales of commissions
coming of $44,300 (Ex. 5). Petty requested a representation of fact from Gindy by telegram and also
through Mickelson's Freeway telephone calls to Gindy. The request was for information on a question
of fact: did Gindy have on hand now orders, not
deals, which would produce at least $17,000 of com·
missions and would Gindy pay directly to Plaintiffs
without paying anyone else until Plaintiffs were
first paid the sum of $17,000 of such commissionsf
The request was for a fact and a promise based on
the fact on which Plaintiffs could rely to make a
substantial change of position. The admissions of
Mr. Walters regarding two telephone calls, alth~ugh
scanty, are loaded with inferences of fact. Gmdy
learned that Plaintiffs would not rely on Freeway
Sales' assignment of $44,300 of alleged commissions

15
coming to support a new loan to Freeway Sales. Gindy learned that Mr. Petty wanted the "orders" (word
used in telegram Ex. 1) separated from the "Deals
in Process," (the phrase used in Ex. 5) .
Mr. Walters testified regarding Plaintiffs request for a representation of fact on which Plaintiffs could rely in making a substantial loan of money
to Freeway Sales as follows:
We had two phone calls on the day of
the telegram, to Mr. Ginsburg, the owner of
the company. The initial phone call was Mr.
Mickelson and direct to Mr. Ginsburg - pertaining to this matter. It was referred to me.
A second phone call was made presumably after
conyersation with Mr. Petty, and as a result of the
second phone call the telegram was sent ( R. 109).
Q. Did you not take part in the first
telephone conversation?
A. I did. He (Mickelson) called Mr.
Ginsburg and talked about an assignment of
these earnings - these commissions by the
distributors' accounts, we called them, if we
would accept one, etc., and so on. Mr. Ginsburg told him he would have to take the whole
matter up with me. My office at that time
adjoined Mr. Ginsburg's (R. 110).
Q. Did any of you know Mr. Petty was
planning to loan this man $12,000.00 when
he called?
A. No, I knew he was thinking of loaning him $17,000 when he called.
Q. You t h o u g h t seventeen and not
twelve?
A. That is what I was told (R. 121).
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These facts make out Pomeroy's requirement
numbered 4, supra. The representation was made
"with the intention, or at least with the expectation
that it would be acted upon" and as Restatement of
Contracts Sec. 90 supra phrases the needed fact as
a promissory situation which "the promissor should
reasonably expect to induce action."
The Facts Pertaining to The Representation of Fact
Associated with Integrated Promise Reasonably E:i:pected to Induce Action

Mr. Walters was asked why he sent the tele·
gram of September 26, 1962 to Petty Investment
Company. He replied:
A. That was the fact exactly as they were
understood ( R. 14 7, 19) . (Italics added.)
Mr. Petty was asked if he received the reply
from Gindy to his telegram of a request for a state·
met of whether orders were held by Gindy on which
at least $17,000 of commissions would later be paid.
A. Yes, Promptly, - very promptly (R
98, 21).
The telegram of representation and promise of
September 28, 1962 (Ex. 1) addressed to Petty In·
vestment reads as follows:
Will withhold first seventeen thousand
dollars in commissions to Freeway and/or
Mickelson for payment to you. They have suf~
ficient orders in or pending to more than covei
this.
Gindy Mfr. Corp.
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E. Walters Jr. Treasurer. (Ex. 1.)
Let us examine the facts of this telegram in
the light of its surrounding circumstances.

Petty had once before increased a loan from
$~4, 043 to Mickelson ( R. 93) to a loan of $35, 000
to Mickelson's corporation, Freeway Sales ( R. 91).
That extension of credit was done only because a
second mortgage was given as security for more than
the $11,000 increase in the loan. Petty was burned
by reliance on Mickelson's representations as to the
security. It was discovered that Mickelson had given
a mortgage on ground that he did not own, and the
mortgage had to be released ( R. 95) .
Mr. Petty's state of mind on September 28, 1962
when Mickelson came to him on that Saturday morning of September 28, 1962 was not to throw good
money after bad. Nineteen thousand four hundred
remained past due on the old '61 debt of $35,000
(R. 94).

Mickelson represented to Petty on that day that
he woukl assign to him the commissions on "Deals
in Progress" due and to become due to Freeway Trailer Sales, Inc., of $44,300. (ADDENDUM "A," Ex.
5). The factual condition of Mr. Petty's mind was
that he would not trust Mickelson's representations.
His mind was not interested in "deals in progress."
There would be no additional loan unless he could
get a representation from Gindy that it had orders,
not deals in progress which might result in orders,
producing $17,000 commissions. Petty's mind be-
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lieved that out of $44,300 commissions on deals in
progress there ought to be $17,000 commission~
earned to be paid when delivery was had on tru1
orders pending, because of work done from March
1, 1962 to September 28, 1962 by Freeway Sales.
Mr. Petty requested that assurance from Cindy
by telegram ( R. 97). Mickelson wanted desperate!;
to secure a new loan of $12,000. With Mr. Petti~
knowledge and assent, Mickelson acting on beh~li
of himself and Plaintiffs made the first telephone
call to Ginsburg, owner of Gindy, and Walters, its
treasurer.
The substance of that call was that he (Mickelson) "talked about an assignment of these earniugs
- these commissions by the distributor's accounts,
we called them, if we would accept one, etc., and so
on." (R. 110, 18-21.) (Italics added.) Mr. Walter~
testified further regarding the purpose of the first
phone call from Mickelson thus:
To find out if he would accept an assign·
ment - if he could arrange this assignment,
would we accept it? (R. 110, 25-26.)
Then after that call Mr. Petty and Mr. Mickelson held a further conference. It is a necessary in·
ference of fact that Mr. Petty would not loan any
monies on a mere acknowledgement of an assignment
of commissions earned and to be earned in the future
on Mickelson's assignment of estimated $44,300 of
commissions on "Deals in Progress" (Ex. 5). The
facts warranting this finding are supported by the
following evidence :
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A second call was necessary to inform Gindy
that the telegram must be to Petty Investment Company, that it must not be in terms merely an acknowledgment or acceptance of Freeway's assignment.
It must, by its terms represent that Freeway Trailer Sales, Inc., had at least $17,000 of commissions
coming on bona fide orders in Gindy's hands, not
probable commissions on "deals in progress." This
fact is made evident by the absence of any reference
to an assignment in the telegram and Mr. Walter's
testimony about the second telephone call.
. . . A second phone call was made prema bly after conversation with Mr. Petty,
and as a result of the second phone call the
telegram was sent (R. 109). (Italics added.)
Another necessary inference of fact regarding
the talk between Mickelson and Petty just prior to
the second telephone call is that Mr. Petty made
clear to Gindy through Mickelson's second phone call
that what Petty wanted in the telegram was four
things:
(a) The telegram must be addressed to Petty
Investment Company.
(b) It must state that there are enough "orders," not "deals in process" to assure later payment
of $17,000.
(c) It must represent that Gindy does not now
ha\'e any claims against Freeway or Mickelson which
would require prior payment of part or all of those
~17,000 of commissions to any person ahead of Plaintiffs.
1:m
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( d) It must show a willingness to make priority of payment to Plaintiffs without any necessity
of controversy later on or litigation in Pennsylvania
to realize on such promise.
Mr. Walters was not directly asked, why the
telegram did not refer to the talk of assignment, or
why the telegram did not state that commissions
would be paid only if earned later on "deals in process," which were, according to Walters' testimony
supra., the gist of the first conversation.
However, Mr. Walters did testify as follows:

Q. Why did you send it to Petty Investment Company?
A. That was the fact - exactly as the!J
were understood. (Italics added.)
Q. It wasn't a fact they were commissions, was it?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. You told me they were distributor's
accounts.
A. I told you the heading on the general ledger was Discounts (R. 147).
The "telegram" fulfills Pomeroy's factual requirements numbered 1, supra., also stated in the
Ravino case ( 572) supra, of representation of and
or concealment of material facts. Affirmatively,
Gindy represented to Plaintiffs that the facts were
that "they" (Freeway and/or Mickelson) "hare ~u~;
ficient orders in or pending to more than cover th1~.
(Meaning $17,000 in commissions and the promise
to pay those commissions to Plaintiff.)

Bu"'l.-er'.s

or

Status or Order

Represertation

Name

Order

Order

Order

or

Orvil Milne

J\T a)· 16, -62

No. 3915

Claimed forged

PrO.spect ire
Custorner's

1st Interstate
Order

Date

oi

Order

or So-called

No. n( Order

or So-calle<J

or

So~called

as Orde1· T'rue
Fal~f·

False ( R. 136,

R. 128

137)

Comrr1ent
(Ex. G)

Suggestion of

sample trailer

May 18, -62

No. 3914

Wholly fictitious

False (R. 136) Built but
Interstate denied
ordering

Robert J. Orr
June 12, .62
Ten semi-trailers

No. 3900
(Ex. 6)

Time price
stated, no
financing
agreement

False (R. 131,
132)

Multiple leasing
deal

Freeway for Pa- July 16, -62
cific & Atlantic
Shippers

Letter

No. Price

False (R. 142,
143)

Never billed
(Ex. 7)

Peebles Trucking July 18, -62
Company, Increased 3 to 6
trailers
Sept. 6, -62

No. 3902
(Ex. 6)

7 month & no
financing
agreement
(R.119)
No price (R. 121)

False (R. 119,
121, 126)

Peebles bought
elsewhere (R.
119) commission
earned

Earl Morrison
1 semi-trailer

Aug. 8, -62

No. 3903
(Ex. 6)

Time price
specified,
note accepted

True a Firm
Order (R. 135,
138)

Gindy cancelled
without legal
justification

Interstate Motor
Lines 20 semitrailers

Sept. 25, -62

No. 3909

Price with
exchange of 20
used semi's

True (R. 130,
Ex. 6)

This true order
filled as agreed

No number

Letter only
signed by
Mickelson

Status Unknown Testimony
(R. 138)
Incomplete

Capital Trucking No date given
Company 50
semi-trailers
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The telegram also indicated by its phraseology
that the state of mind of Gindy by its managing officers was "in the language of Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 90 to induce action ... of a definite and
substantial character on the part of the promisee."
The Facts About the Orders and the Non-Order
"DEALS IN PROCESS" (See Chart page 21.)
A thorough examination of the testimony of .Mr.
Walters shows the facts regarding the truth or falsity of the representation in the telegram that Freeway and/or Mickelson "have sufficient orders in or
pending to more than cover $17,000 which Gindy
promised to pay to Plaintiffs direct with priority
over all others. The facts prove 2 orders, two fictitious orders and the rest are merely "Deals in Process" in various stages of negotiations with prosprctive customers who had placed no order and were
still free to purchase in the competitive market.
Reliance by Petty on Representation of Fact by Gi11dy and on Gindy's Accompanying Promise, and
Plaintiff's Action of Definite and Substantial Character Done Upon Such Reliance

The dominating facts are a representation intended to produce action by another of equitable e~
forcement and reliance, and action thereon of a def~
nite and substantial character done upon such reliance. That such reliance and action thereon was
induced by Defendant's telegram appears patently
beyond question in this case. All parties are agreed
on this point. The record finds no dissent.
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Q. I will ask you Mr. Petty, if you placed
any reliance upon the telegram, Exhibit 1?
A. Complete reliance (R. 101, 5).
The trial court observed in granting Defendant's
motion to dismiss Plaintif's second cause of action
sounding in contract as follows:
THE COURT: ... I am not questioning
your reliance. Your evidence is ample on that,
but I see no proof it was false ( R. 107).
Even counsel for Defendant admitted Plaintiff's
reliance on said telegram Exhibit 1, in briefly arguing his motion for dismissal of Plaintiff's contract
action.
MR. PIKE : . . . In the first place the
telegram dated 9-28-62, which is relied on by
the plaintiff, is just not a contract in and of
itself. Aside from the Statute of Frauds, and
others, it does not set forth all of the terms of
any mutual agreement (R. 106). (Italics
added.)
It recites no consideration flowing back to the person who is supposedly to be collecting it, and in fairness, I do not think it can logically construe as a contract or agreement in any sense, other than in the
assignment sense (R. 106-107).
It is painfully apparent that Mr. Pike did not
have in mind any of the hundreds of cases that have
been decided under Section 90 of the Restatement
of Contracts, Section 90, - "Informal Contracts
Without Assent or Consideration."
That the Plaintiffs did take definite and substantial action in "changing their position for the
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worse" by reason of such reliance is also beyond question. Plaintiffs in reliance on said telegram did loan
to Freeway Trailer Sales, Inc., $12,000 (R. 89 and
90, 100 and Ex. 4).
A further fact is that Defendants did pay to
Plaintiffs $4,000 (R. 101 on February 13, 1963 R.
149) claiming that $4,000 was the total commission
earned by Freeway Sales on a sale of 20 semi-trailers
to Interstate Truck Lines at a price of $144,200 (R.
130, Ex. 6, No. 3909) and also claiming $4,000 to be
the total commissions earned by Freeway Sales.
Michelson represented that all commissions were
earned by Freeway Sales, none by himself individually. (Ex. 5.) This was not disputed. Apparently Freeway Sales understood that its commission on this
sale would be $17,500. (See: Ex. 5 ADDENDUM
A.) The trial court thought this alleged total corn·
mission of only $4,000 on a transaction paying Cindy $144,200 was out of line (R. 130, 14-15).
Michelson's understanding that Freeway's corn·
mission on the Interstate order should have been
$17,500 on a sale of $144,200 seems reasonable in
view of Mr. Walter's testimony that Freeway's corn·
mission on the Robert J. Orr Deal (had it become an
order) "would have been 23 or 25 thousand dollars"
(R. 113, 24) on a total sale price of $179,520 (R.
114 and particularly R. 116, 1 7-19) . The Orr deal
like the Peebles deal never became an order, because
of the delay of Gindy to work out satisfactory fi·
nancing for the time price deal.
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Fact of Cindy's Recognition of Some Indirect Benefit to Hai1e Plaintiffs Further Finance Freeway
.Tmiler Sales, Inc.

There is no evidence in the Record of Gindy ever
assisting Freeway Sales with financing. However
Cindy was pleased and desirous of having Plaintiff's
finance Freeway Sales in its operations for Gindy's
benefit.
The realization by Gindy, the representor, that
it would receive some indirect benefit by having Petty Investment Company further finance its agent
Freeway Trailer Sales Inc., by making a substantial
loan to it is evidenced by the following testimony
of Mr. Walters (R. 121-122):

Q. When did you become aware of Mr.
Mickelson's financial difficulties, Mr. Walters?
A. Well it was common knowledge Mickelson had financial problems as long as I can
remember.
Q. And you knew that when Mr. Petty
called, didn't you? (Italics added.)
A. Sure.
Q. And you knew Mr. Petty was planning to loan this man $12,000 when he called
you, didn't you?
A. No. I knew he was thinking of loaning him $17,000 when he called (R. 121).
Q. This would have been an advantage
to your company wouldn't it, to have these
finances loaned to Mr. Mickelson at this time?
(R. 121-122.)
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A. Not particularly.

Q. You knew he was in financial disand ~hat he had a number of transac.
pendmg for your company, isn't that
right?
A. That's correct.
Q. So certainly you wanted to see him
succeed?
A. That's correct ( R. 122).
t~ess
t~ons

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AS A
PART OF FINDING NUMBERED "1," THAT
MICKELSON WAS A FRANCHISED DEALER
OF DEFENDANT ON SEPTEMBER 28, 1962,
AND ACTED ONLY IN A PERSONAL CAPAC·
ITY IN REQUESTING EXHIBIT "l," THE
TELEGRAM FROM GINDY, AND ERRED IN
FAILING TO FIND THAT SUCH REQUEST
WAS MADE BY FREEWAY TRAILER SALES,
INC., A UT AH CORPORATION FOR ITSELF
AND FOR PETTY INVESTMENT COMPANY,
A UTAH PARTNERSHIP AND THAT FREE·
WAY WAS THE SOLICITING AGENT OF DE·
FENDANT FROM MARCH 1, 1962 UNTIL MAY
18, 1963, BY CONTINUOUS COURSE OF DEAL·
ING.
The earlier statement of facts under the head·
ing of Factual Relations of Gindy and Mickelson
personally and of Gindy and Freeway Trailer Sales
Inc., by continuous course of dealing disclosed that
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Mr. Mickelson signed his name to Exhibit 2 intend-

ing that the rights under it were to be exercised by
freeway Sales. It also discloses that all other documents introduced as evidence Exhibits 1, 4, 5, 6, and
7, which show Freeway Sales as the acting agent.

When Plaintiff's attorney asked Walters whether Mickelson was Gindy's distributor the reply was
that he might have been but was not allowed to operate in that manner. ( R. 123, and 145.)
Mr. Walters made it clear that the agreement
of March 1, 1962, would have allowed Mr. Mickelson to operate as a distributor had he been sufficiently financed so that in fact he could operate in that
manner ( R. 128).

Q. And doesn't that agreement (Ex. 2)
provide that he purchase trailers, or he sells
trailers and then purchase them from Gindy
to meet sales he makes?
A. I believe that provides that (sic ?)
can be a billing directly, or through the dealer.
In a deal such as Peebles (Ex. 6, No. 3902)
you are questioning about his financing. We
have no middleman in terms of endorsing or
anything else ( R. 123) ....
However there was only one billing of a semitl'ailer to Mickelson. The trailer was supposed to be
going to Milne Trucking Lines (Ex. 6, No. 3915)
which supposed order turned out later not to be ordered by Orvil Milne. Someone had taken the liberty
of signing Milne's name as Milme ( m not n on forged
signature) without any authority (R. 129).
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The attempt to deal with Mickelson proved abortive. (Ex. 6, No. 3915 shows "Sold by Freeway Trailer Sales, Inc." by shipping to Freeway Sales or Mickelson, record not clear on this point.)
Mickelson had a concession from us in
mid-August. We billed him and then the invoice went unpaid for a substantial period of
time. We contacted Milne Truck to determine
why, and he denied he had the trailer or ever
ordered it ( R. 128).
There was, however, no intent to put title in
Mickelson to said trailer. For when Plaintiffs attached the trailer, Gindy swore that it was merely
loaned to Mickelson (Affidavit of Walters [R. 14]1
apparently as a demonstrator for Freeway Sales.
This was the semi-trailer attached in this case by
the Plaintiffs ( R. 128), now replaced by a cash bond.
The fact, as shown by the evidence, is that Gindy's agent practiced a fraud on Gindy, its principal
in presenting a forged order (Ex. 6, No. 3915 and
R. 129, 136-137).
The forged Milne order was actually priced out,
and then semi-trailer was manufactured and sent
to Salt Lake City (R. 128). And Gindy in turn innocently misrepresented to Plaintiffs that it had
among its present orders this forged Milne order
on which the commission would have been at least
as much as on the Morrison true order (Ex. 6, No.
3903) approximately $1,000 (R. 114).
Gindy was also fraudulently imposed upon by
its agent Freeway Sales regarding the first Inter-
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state Motor Lines order of May 16, 1962, No. 3914
IR. 136, 7). Apparently this was also priced out be~ausc it, like the forged Milne order, supra, had been
accepted and was discovered to be fictitious in nature by Mr. Ginsburg, owner of Gindy, when he visiterl in Salt Lake City in October, November, or as
late as December 1962 (R. 134).
Mr. Ginsburg was here in town and had
developed the fact that neither the Milne or
Intel'State trailer ever had actually been ordered by the parties that had been represented
to us as having ordered them ( R. 134).
Again the commission would have been approximately $1,000 as on the Morrison trailer (R. 114).
Defendant claimed that it honestly and innocently misrepresented these two orders as included
in the orders which were included in the sufficient
order in to produce more than $17,000 commissions
(Ex. 1).

Petty was induced to rely and act innocently
rm that representation and the promise based upon
it in Exhibit "l."
The question is therefore, when one of two innocent persons must lose which one shall be the loser?
A leading California case answers this question.
In Burgess v. California Mutual B. and L.
Assn. (1930) 210 Cal. 180, 290 P.1029, McKellup
and wife had delivered a deed of trust to defendant
rm two parcels of property to secure a note of
$20,000. Later, needing more funds, they secured a
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letter addressed to them stating that defendants
would release the deed of trust on the McKellup
Heights property for the sum of $6,000. McKellup
showed the letter to plaintiff who loaned $12,0IJIJ
to McKellup on strength of the letter shown to him.
McKellup became bankrupt. Defendant refused to
release its lien for $6,000 offered by Burgess to defendant. Plaintiff sued on promissory estoppel. Defendant pleaded no consideration for the promise.
The supreme court of California reversed for
plaintiff and held that when one of two innocent
persons must suffer by the act of a third, he by
whose affirmative act caused the loss to occur to \hf
person relying must suffer the loss.
The foregoing case is cited favorably in an ar·
ticle "Promissory Estoppel in California," 5 Stan·
ford Law Review 783, 793, Apr. 1953. The article
deals only with promissory estoppel as a cause of
action and does not deal of estoppel as a defense.
This supreme court has upheld the above prin·
ciple in Hilton v. Sloan ( 1910 37 Utah 359, 379, 108
P. 689. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 1941 5th
ed., Sec. 809, p. 218, points out that the Hilton case
cites his earlier edition on this point (p. 218 N. 8).
Pomeroy states the rule that governs in the cas~ of
mistake of Gindy as to the genuineness of the Milne
and first Interstate order as follows:
In such a case the party might not only
be ignorant or mistaken, but he might ~yep
believe his own statements to be true. This is
a plain application of the principle that where
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one of two innocent persons must suffer, the
loss will fall upon him whose conduct made
it possible.
Other cases supporting the same principle are
cited by Pomeroy: Jett vs. Crittenden, 89 Ark., 349,
116 S. W. 665; Stubbs vs. Franklin & M. R. Co., 101
Me. 355, 64 A. 625.

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS
FINDING NUMBERED 2, THAT PLAINTIFF
OFFERED NO EVIDENCE OF FALSITY OF DEFENDANT'S REPRESENT A TI ON OF PRESENT
FACTS THAT IT HAD ON HAND "ORDERS"
TO PRODUCE COMMISSIONS TO FREEWAY
AND" OR MICKELSON OF MORE THAN $17,000,
AND ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT
DID NOT MAKE ANY FALSE REPRESENTATION, AND ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE EVIDENCE PROVED SAID REPRESENTATION TO BE ONLY PARTIALLY TRUE, BUT
PRIMARILY FALSE, AND ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT MADE SAID
PRIMARILY FALSE REPRESENTATION TO
INDUCE PLAINTIFFS TO LOAN $12,000 TO
FREEWAY TRAILER SALES, INC. AND THAT
PLAINTIFFS DID MAKE SAID LOAN IN RELIANCE ON SAID PRIMARILY FALSE REPRESENTATION OF FACT AND INTEGRATED
PROMISE OF DEFENDANT TO PAY PLAINTIFFS DIRECTLY IN A PRIORITY POSITION
SAID $17,000, AND ERRED IN NOT GIVING
JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFFS FOR $5,500.
The facts are that there were only two true
orders, two fictitious orders, supra, and four "deals
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in progress" as shown by the chart classifying the
orders and so-called orders under the heading, "Tht
Facts About the Orders and the Non-order" DEALS
IN PROGRESS, supn1.
The word order has been judicially construed.
Between the parties it means in this case an offer
to buy one or more semi-trailers with all of the essential terms which will become a contract on acceptance. Seeding Machine Company vs. Conwnwealt/i,
152 Kentucky 589, 153 S. W. 972.
A federal case involving whether the sales agent
had submitted orders, when he had submitted customer's specifications of minimum yardage of cloth
on which prices had not been fixed held that they
were not orders - until the price was determined on
said requests of customers. Freund vs. Hodges Finishing Company C. C. A., Mass. 14 F. 2d 424.
Gindy knew the difference between orders to
be filed later by manufacture and shipment and mere
"deals in process" not yet ripened into orders, or
because of the nature of its business such knowledgP
must surely be imputed to Gindy.
Let us note again the wording of Section 90 of
the Restatement of Contracts. Informal Contracts
Without Assent or Consideration.
A promise which the promissor should rea·
sonably expect to induce action or forebear~
ance of a definite and substantial charac~ei
on the part of the promisee and whic~ do.es i~
duce such action or forebearance is bmdmg if
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injustice can be avoided only by the enforcement of the promise.
The need for this doctrine in the half way area
unween contract and tort is succinctly stated by the
author of an excellent article in 14 Ill., L. R. 187204, at 203, 204, No. 2, June 1941.
But where a no-bargained for consideration can be spelled out, there has been a need
for a doctrine capable of preventing a betrayal of trust and confidence that may be placed
in a promise, at least to the extent of compensation for injury arising from the change of
position. (204)
The article senses the broad underlying principle of Section 90 in the following statement:
The circumstances surrounding non-bargain promises may be entirely different from
the ordinary contract situation and it is not
unnatural that different policies should apply
in measuring the damages. There are promises
which are made carelessly or breached forgetfully, causing injury in a manner similar to
tortious acts of negligence. Promises to insure
and various other business arrangements are
illustrative. The factual elements are so variable that it would be better not to categorize
the principle of promissory estoppel as one
of "tort" or "contract." The cases citing Section 90 indicate that it is a principle measure
of recovery under a doctrine for the prevention of injustice need not be limited to any
single formula but should vary with the circumstances." Ibid. 203.
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The terminology in this developing area of tht
law has come under close analysis.
Professor Corbin prefers to call this relatively
new action the "reliance doctrine" or "action in r;.
liance doctrine." See lA Corbin, Contracts, 1963 ed.,
Sec. 200, 204.
Professor Corbin analyzes the "Limits of the
Action in Reliance Doctrine" in Sec. 200, from which
the following quotations are taken:
First, it can be said with assurance that
the action or forbearance must amount to a
substantial change of position.
Certainly in the instant case the loaning ul
$12,000 was a substantial change of position.
Secondly, it can be said with equal assur·
ance that the action or forbearance must either
have been actually foreseen by the promisor,
or must be of such a kind as a reasonable per·
son in his position would have foreseen when
making the promise which determined the ex·
tent and scope of the promise. (Sec. 200, p.
216.)
Defendant actually forsaw that Petty woula
make a substantial loan to Freeway Sales if its tele·
gram led him to believe that the $17,000 would be
paid to him from orders in Defendant's hands on
September 28, 1962. This Defendant admitted ha\'·
ing forseen a loan to Freeway Sales of $17,000. (R.
121.) $17,000 includes $12,000.
Thirdly, a promise must hav~ been ma~:
and this promise ... must have mduced t
action ... in reliance on it.
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The telegram was so worded in its representation of more than $17,000 commissions coming to
Freeway when shipments of trailers and collections
due on such deliveries were made and its tied-in
promise to give Plaintiffs priority of such payments
directly that it is beyond a shadow of a reasonable
doubt that the said representation and coupled promise did induce the loan of $12,000 to Freeway Sales.
Professor Corbin introduces the requirement of
degrees of definiteness of Plaintiff's action, under
Section 90 as follows :
All action is definite after it occurs: so,
the Institute must have meant that the promisor must have had reason to forsee the definite action or forbearance that in fact followed. Without doubt, the more keen and accurate the foresight of the promisor was or
ought to have been, the stronger i,s the case of
rnforcement." (Italics added.)
In this case the promissor saw keenly and accurately that a substantial loan to Freeway Sales
awaited receipt of its Exhibit 1 telegram.
The rule constructed by the Law Institute in section 90 of the Restatement is limited
to cases in which the action or forbearance
in reliance is on the part of the promisee. This
may be as far as it is safe to go on the basis
of cases already decided. But in new cases,
the courts need not feel themselves equally restricted.
Finally, the Restatement justifies enforcement of the promise only 'if injustice
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can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise.' This raises the perilous question
"What is justice, without giving any rules 0; ,
standards for its answer?" Here, too, tht
courts are accustomed to the peril. But if all
the other requirements of the stated r~le are
satisfied, does not justice always require en.
forcement of the promise? So far as the Itt·
statement itself informs us, the answer is
Yes." Ibid., Sec. 200.
From the earlier statement of facts in their
setting of factual requirements of promissory estop·
pel and from Professor Corbin's excellent analysis
of the nature and scope of the legal requirements for '
promissory estoppel, Plaintiffs contend that the
propositions of its Point II are fulfilled. The detaile(I ,
drafting of Exhibit 1, the choice of words used, the
purpose of their use, the natural result of their use,
and the circumstances surrounding the meticulous·
ness with which the telegram, Exhibit 1, was worded
to induce the definite and substantial action which
followed will be more elaborately analyzed under
Point V.
1

1

POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
LACK OF PROOF OF FALSITY AND IN RE:
QUIRING PLAINTIFF TO PROVE F ALSIT 1F
WHICH IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT 0
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL.
The Court failed to recognize that Plaintiff had
fully proved the requirements of its action of prom·
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issory equitable estoppel or "action in reliance" in
Professor Corbin's phrase under the Restatement of
Contracts, Section 90, supra. Pomeroy, supra, states
that fraud is not an essential element of promissory
estoppel. If proved, it may be an added, but unnecessary element in strengthening Plaintiff's position if
the question of substantial damage for example
might be in question.
It is clea1· from a reading of Section 90 of the
Restatement, supra, that proof of this action is made
ollt whPn the elements of equitable estoppel are shown
in Plaintif's favor.
Nor can Defendant be allowed to prevent Plaintiffs recove1·y either by proving his ignorance or
mistake of trnth or falsity of its representation and
promise. As pointed out by Professor Corbin supra,
Plaintiff's case is proved without reference to the
truth or falsity of the representation. (Sec. 200;
See also Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 809.)
If the representation that there were enough
true orders on hand to produce commissions of
$17,000 and such commissions failed in part by
breaches of contract of dissatisfied customers, still
Defendant would be held to make good its representation and associated, dependent promise.
If Defendant claimed that it made a false statement innocently as it did in the supposed-to-be-order
of Milne Trnck Lines and of the first Interstate
order still it is held to its representation of fact and
dependent promise, because of the two innocent parties the reprPsento1· and promisor must make good
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to the person induced to rely and by relying <liri
act substantially upon such reliance.
The estoppel is to prevent Defendant frm:
cha~ging his position to the injury of the persor
relymg and acting substantially on such reliance.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIKD
THAT FREEWAY TRAILER S A LES HAD
EARNED MORE THAN $9,500 IN COMMJS.
SIONS BY PERFORMANCE OF FREEWAY'~
DUTIES AS A SOLICITING AND SELLIM
AGENT, AND UNWARRANTED REFUSALBY
GINDY TO FIRM UP INTO AN ORDER THI
EARNESTLY PROPOSED DEAL BY PEEBLE
The foregoing facts and Exhibit 6, No. 3911:
-the Earl Morrison--0rder shows a true and direc:
order of August 8, 1962, with the time price an
percent interest (flat) and a note extending tt11
price received and accepted by Gindy. According tn
Walter's testimony Morrison's trailer was manufac·
tured and shipped as far as Chicago at which poin;
shipment was stopped by Gindy, November or De·
cember of 1962 (R. 134).
The only reason given for the stop shipmen·
of the Morrison trailer was that Gindy discoYerer,
that it had been deceived by its agent into belieYini
that the Milne and first Interstate were valid ordet'
( R. 134-135). This of course was no excuse for n
payment of the commission of $1,000 (R.114) earnec
by Freeway on the Morrison order. Gindy had earltt!
checked the credit of Morrison and had accepted thi
111
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firm order. The comm1ss10n of $1,000 was therefore clearly earned and is due to Plaintiffs.
It is also a principle of the law of agency that
if the agent presents a customer willing, able, ready
to buy, and the principal without legal justification
or real excuse refuses to firm up the deal into an
order, that then the agent is entitled to his commission. This the facts show stand true on the Peebles
so-called order, Exhibit 6, number 3902. The testimony regarding this so-called order is as follows:
The so-called order by Charles E. Peebles No.
0902 was originally for three semi-trailers Model
238 Vr, placed July 18, 1962 (Ex. 6). Mr. Peebles
was sincere in desiring to secure Gindy trailers. On
September 6th or 9th by correspondence Peebles indicated he desired to increase the number of trailers
which he wished to purchase, when financing was
worked out, from three to six (R. 115-116).
Gindy took over the effort at arranging for a
financing of the prospective Peebles purchase. The
trailers were to be used in the service of Pillsbury
Mills and the price was to be $15,096.40 each. (R.
116). The commission to Freeway was to be $6,400
on each of the six trailers ( R. 116 ( 7-8) prior to installation of refrigerators in each unit. Each unit
was priced at $15,096.40 ( R. 117). Freeway's figure
of $14,600 commission on an order of $90,000 which
is one-sixth was well in line. This is the commission
as shown by Exhibit 5, page 2.
The deal was conditioned on financing of Peebles which Gindy proposed to be done with the Bank
of America in Los Angeles ( R. 119).
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The bank suggested through Mr. John Becker
by letter of September 27, l 962, that Cindy pl'oceed
slowly ( R. 119-120).
Thereafter, ·walter's did a thorough check on
Peebles and he and Ginsburg found Peebles credit to
be good (R. 126).
The principal, Gincly delayed and delayed and
delayed beyond the generous patience of Peebles in
arranging the financing after Gincly found his credit
to be good, until January 22, 1963, o\·er six months
later Peebles wrote Cindy to forget it (R. 119). Peebles cancelled and bought elsewhere ( R. 119-25).
The evidence shows the Peebles deal to be a cle3r
breach of the fiduciary duty of Cindy to its agent.
Freeway Trailer Sales, Inc. Gindy failed to use rea·
sonable diligence to protect the interest of its agent.
Gindy did not excuse its neglect in this Peeble'
matter because it was too busy in Pennsylvania. lt
admitted, supra, that on double checking Peebles
credit was good. Its only explanation is shown by
Mr. Walters testimony as follows; which is in n11
respect a sufficient legal excuse for failure to perform its duty to arrange financing for Peebles.
Q. (Mr. Kump) You say that is the re~
son you turned Peebles down, was the credit
of Peebles?
A. No, no. It was the problems he haa
made he continued without any effort to
'
straighten
out.
.
We had financial statements from Pee·
bles. "\Ve had done a rather complet.e report
on Peebles. The joint reaction was it was i
good credit. (R. 126.)
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The evidence shows that Gindy, a large national
organization, acted as if it had no duties whatever
toward Freeway Sales as its soliciting agent. Mr.
·walters testified that the first Interstate order of
May 18, 1962, No. 3914 was just left lying around
until about November and December when Mr. Ginsburg discovered that it was a fictitious and fraudulent order, and because of that and the allegedly
forged Milne order, Gindy stopped shipment of the
Morrison trailer in Chicago (Testimony, supra).
This tale is very hard to believe. Gindy was negotiating for about three months prior to the big
Interstate order of $144,300 secured on September
Z5, 1962. But there is no contrary testimony in the
record.
The evidence compels the conclusion that it was
Gincly's unwarranted delay, and insistence that Peebles clear up some collateral matter which was no
business of Gindy's that killed the deal. Freeway
Sales had found a reliable customer with good credit
rating, ready, willing and able to purchase six Gindy Trai!Prs. Peebles unjustifiably prevented the
deal from becoming an order. Is Freeway and Plaintiffs in turn entitled to the commission of that transaction which had been priced at $152,441, and on
which Mr. Walters testified the commission would
have been $24,000? (R. 114.) Agency law says the
commission is due because failure is attributable
to the principal Gindy.
Mechem on Agency, 1914, Vol. 1, Sec. 1535
writes:
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Each ~ase rests upon its own peculiar
facts ?-nd circumstances, and the inquiry in
every instance must be: 1. What did the agent
undertake to do? 2. Has he done it and if not
then, 3. To whose act or to what 'occurrence;
is the failure to be attributed?
'
The agent is entitled to the commission if the
sale is prevented by the principal's fault. Mechem
Sec. 1533, n.55 citing Tousey v. Etzel, 9 Utah 329:
POINT V.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING, IN ITS
FINDING NUMBERED 2, THAT DEFENDANT
DID NOT INTEND OR UNDERTAKE TO DECEIVE THE PLAINTIFFS, AND ERRED IN
FAILING TO FIND THAT THE DEFENDANTS
ACTIVELY CONCEALED FROM PLAINTIFF
THE MATERIAL FACT THAT THE SO-CALLED
ORDERS STATED IN EXHIBIT I TO BE IN OR
PENDING WERE NOT ALL ORDERS BUT
WERE MAINLY MERELY "DEALS IN PROC·
ESS" AND INTENDED TO INDUCE PLAIN·
TIFFS TO RELY AND ACT IN A DEFINITE
AND SUBSTANTIAL WAY IN EXTENDING
NEWCREDIT TO DEFENDANT'S AGENT FREEWAY TRAILER SALES, INC., ON A ONE·
F 0 UR TH TRUE AND THREE-FOURTHS
FALSE REPRESENTATION OF FACT AND ITS
ACCOMPANYING, DEPENDENT PROMISE TO
PAY PLAINTIFFS $17,000 OF COMMISSIONS
IN OR PENDING IN FAVOR OF FREEWAY
SALES.
A half truth is the blackest kind of lie. A less
than half truth deliberately made to induce a third
party to make a substantial loan to the agent of the
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representor and promisor that reimbursement of the
loan will be made to the representee and promisee
is a fraud of active concealment.
What is the fraud element in this relatively new
~oncept of an equity contract "action in Reliance,"
(Professor Corbin's phrase, supra.) which does not
require a bargained-for consideration and against
which the Defendant will not be allowed to defend
on grounds of the statute of frauds or to now assert
that the facts were different than he represented
them to be, whether by intent, negligence or mistake?
It surely is a relatively new type of legal animal
because before Section 90 of the Restatement of
Contracts and Section 378 of the Restatement of
Agency representation, reliance and damage were
the dominant elements of deceit. Consideration and
meeting of the minds were the dominant elements
of contract.
Promissory estoppel, then, is a fraud prevention doctrine. If the elements of a promise (or usually a promise coupled with a representation of fact)
be made to - or reasonably can be expected to induce a definite type of action by another who acts
in a substantial manner in relying on the promise
or on the promise coupled with a representation of
a material present or past fact, then equity says to
defendant you will not be allowed to injure or damage the promisee by asserting ignorance or mistake
of the facts represented or to renig on your promise.
To allow the Defendant to change or modify
o1· partly explain away the position he originally
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took to induce Plaintiff to act would at this time
allow D:fe_ndant to_ practice presently a fraud upon
the Plambff. Section 90 removes the requirement
of scienter necessary for an action of deceit.
When there is a representation of fact couple(]
with the promise only three of the elements of the
ancient catch-as-catch-can action of deceit need he
proved by Plaintiff to establish this contract: (a) a
promise or a promise coupled with a represented fact
or fact representation made to induce or reasonablv
expected to induce action by another, (b) Relianc~
by Plaintiff, (the intent to induce action gives the
right to rely) and ( c) substantial damage that 11~1!
occur if Defendant be allowed to plead lack of con·
sideration, the statute of frauds, or to change the
position which he originally took to induce, or to
expect, Plaintiff to change its position.
These are the three elemets of promissory estop·
pel found by Dean Benjamin F. Boyer, Dean of Tern·
pie University Law School in his most extensiw
research of the adjudicated cases. Promissory Estop·
pel: Principle from Precedents 50 Mech. L. R. 638·
7 4 at 644, March 1952.
Let us fit this new equity contract providing
for action in reliance for the purpose of fraud pre·
vention in the ways explained above into the phrase·
ology of the closing phrase of Section 90 supra: a
determination that "injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise."
It was not until 1953 in Ravino v. Pri.ce, m
Utah 559, 260 P2d 570 that this court repudiated
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the old hard-to-die doctrine of Elliot v. Whitmore
(1901) 23 Utah 342, 65 P. 70 which limited the application of equitable estoppel to situations where
there was found an "intention of the promisor to
abandon an existing right. Equitable estoppel was
limited to a defense, not allowed as a contract cause
of action.
This Court took the step forward under Section 90 with much caution. Justice Wolfe, a great
jurist in taking forward steps in the law could not
then go along with the application of Section 90 announced by the California Supreme Court in Sey1110111· r. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88 of equitable
enforcement of an oral promise of employment for
ten years. By dicta this Court declared in 1953 that
one of the factual requirements by the "action in
reliance doctrine" must be a false representation
which need not be intentional or active concealment
11f a material fact which is to be inferred from ignorance or mistake of the representator. Pomeroy,
.~11pra, Sec. 809.
Briefly, the Seymour decision, supra, enforced
an oral promise of employment made by the defendant to plaintiff which defendant agreed to put in
11Titing by estopping the defendant to assert the
statute of frauds, when he brought action for damages upon being discharged after 2 years.
However, only three years after the Ravino case
this court found favor with the California supreme
:omt decision in the Seymour case, supra. by dicta
m Easton v. Wycoff, ( 1956) 4 Utah 2d 386, 389,
295 P2d 332.
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This favor. with the Seynwur case, ::;upra, wa~
found. by applymg t?~ test of Section 90 of damage~
resultmg from definite and substantial action r
the prm-r:isee although there was no external misrt;;'.
resentat10n of fact and no way of proving the prom.
issor's mind to be bona fide or cagey at the time
of making the promise.
This court observed that the detriment suffereu
by the promisee for the no-bargain promise (con·
sideration being lacking) was not only "definite anri
substantial" but under the circumstances was "unconscionable." Easton case, 389.
The analysis of this court is highly probativ:
In Seymour v. Oelrichs, supra, "plaintiff gaye up a
lifetime position in order to enter defendant's sen
ice and worked for him for two years upon the de·
fendant's promise to put the contract in writing. It:
this case the court held the defendant es topped tn
assert the Statute. However, this often cited cme
might well be contrasted with the case of B.F.C
Morris Co. v. Mason, 171 Okl. 589, 39 P. 2d m
likewise involving long-term employment contract
and a promise to reduce the contract to writing;
the difference between the cases being that in thr
latter the plaintiff did not show injury of the type
sufficient to invoke an estoppel." ( 389.)
Plaintiff contends that the instant Petty caft
is governed clearly by the requirements .of _Sect10:
90. Present fraud on, and injustice to Plamtiffs can
1
be prevented only by estopping ~efendant ~~o.m 11 ~'. :
saying that it only had "deals m progress mstta

1
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of orders in or pending on which the itegrated dependent promise was made.
Testing the facts of this Petty case against the
requirements of Section 90 we find as follows:
Defendants expressly drafted Exhibit 1 for the
known purpose of inducing Plaintiffs to make a substantial loan to its selling and soliciting agent Freeway Sales and that Plaintiffs acted and relied thereon as Defendants had intended.
It's sheer nonsense to contend that Gindy didn't
know or was not expected to know the difference
between "orders in or pending" and "deals in progress" with prospective customers. The language of
"assignment," which was the gist of the first telephone conversation on September 28, 1962 by Gindy's admission ( R. 110) is patently lacking from
Exhibit 1. The telegram bears internal evidence of
a highly shrewd effort in choice of words.
The fact is that the offices of Mr. Ginsburg and
Mr. Walters were next to each other (R. 10). They
conferred with each other on the day of the two telephone calls. The second telephone call after Mickelson "presumably talked with Petty" conveyed the
idea of the kind of representation which would induce Mr. Petty to rely thereon and to act thereon
in making a substantial loan to Defendant's agent
(R.109).
It is most significant that the telegram does
not state that Gindy will acknowledge and conform
to a pending assignment by Mickelson of commissions on deals in progress. The prospective assignment and loan was the language of the first tele-
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phone call. To use the language of assignment Gindr
concluded would not produce the result which Gindr
wanted for its agent Freeway Sales. Reference l'·
any assignment was studiously avoided in drafting
the telegram, Exhibit 1.
More pointedly, Exhibit 1 actively conceals 3 ~
shrewdly as a crafty drafts man could possibly do thf
true status of commissions then coming to Freewai.
Sales and/or Mickelson upon filling orders of whicii
only Gindy had first-hand, superior, knowledge sine.
only Gindy was negotiating inquiries of prospectirt
customers into orders. The very words chosen to induce Plaintiff's action were words used to concta!
the fact that Gindy did not have the orders whici
it represented it had.
Walters testified that he intentionally refraine(I
from clearly stating what his books showed as dut
Mickelson (meaning Freeway) because he wanted
Mr. Petty to rely on the telegram. He didn't want
Petty to ask questions.
A. I used the word "order" because the)·
were ordered.
Q. No difference to our mind betwee1:
orders and deals?
A. I might use the word interchange·
ably.
Q. I see. What did you intend by corn·
missions?
.
h
A I used the word commiss10ns; tee ·
nically. in our books it is labeled,, and s1~Jll1'
"Distributors Accounts Payable. (A. ·
Q. Why in the telegram didn't you sa:.
Distributor's Discounts payable?
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A. Because Mr. Petty probably called
me up and wanted to know what it was (R.
145).
Q. Mr. Walters, you said that if you
used the term, Distributor's Discounts Payable, instead of commissions, Mr. Petty would
have called you; is that right?
A. Yes.

Q. Why would he have called you?
A. I don't know the terminology he

might use in his general ledger any more than
he would know what we use in ours.
Q. When you use a generally accepted
term used in the industry why would you be
concerned about this?
A. Maybe he wouldn't be. You asked me
why and I answered because it was confusing.
Q. You said if he was confused he would
call you. Why would he have called you?
A. He would have wanted to know what
is Distributor's Discounts Payable. I would
have, if someone sprung an unfamiliar term
on me. (R. 146.)
This case presents then not only the equitable
necessity of fraud prevention by estopping Defendant from now changing its position and asserting
that it had primarily, merely "deals in progress with
prospective customers," and not orders which would
bring more than $17,000 in commissions as represented .
Plaintiffs contend that the foregoing facts make

out studied, active concealment by Gindy of the true
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facts in drafting and sending Exhibit 1 on September 28, 1962, to Petty Investment Company.
Inju.sti~e of substantial kind will certainly bt

dealt Plamtiffs unless Defendant be held to its representation and integrated promise that it had on
September 28, 1962 orders which would produ1·p
more than $17,000 which is the amount it promisell
to pay to Plaintiff in priority or all other possible
claimants.
This Court has aptly said in a case involving
commissions earned,
The law will seldom allow a plea of contributory negligence to a deliberate wrong.
Johnson v. Allen, ( 1945) 108 Utah 148, 1.ii
p 2d 134.
While scienter is not required under Section
90, when scienter is present it makes a stronger ca1e
for Plaintiff. We respectively submit that the fact1
make out a case of active concealment of the true
facts with the purpose of inducing Plaintiffs to rely
thereon.
Numerous cases are cited on this rapidly expanding action of promissory estoppel in the annotations of 115 A. L. R. 911 and 48 A. L. R. 2d 106~.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, Plaintiffs conclude:
1. That Plaintiff's proof of facts in this case
is ample to establish the factual requirements of an
action of promissory estoppel according to the re·
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quirements of Section 90 of the Restatement and the
analyses of the cases by Pomeroy jurisprudence Sections 805 and 809, supra, and the analyses of Professor Corbin on contracts, supra, and of Professor
Williston to be hereafter mentioned.
2. That the Court should have found that Plain-

tiffs were entitled to a judgment of $2,000 on the
innocent misrepresentations of Gindy, that the Milne
and first Interstate orders were genuine orders when
in fact they were according to the testimony fictitious orders fraudulently presented to Gindy by
Freeway Sales. Of the two innocent parties Gindy
must be the loser.
3. That Plaintiffs are entitled to commissions
earned by Freeway Trailer Sales on the true Morrison order of $1,000 and on the Peebles deal in process, which was killed by the negligence and inattention of the principal Gindy in failure of its fiduciary
duty to work with the financing in duty to its agent
who had performed its duties by presenting a customer ready, willing, and able to buy and with good
credit rating which by ordinary diligence of Gindy
would have resulted in due financing of the proposed purchase of six trailers, and that the commission cnrned on the Peebles deal would be more than
enough to make $4,500 in addition to the earned commis8ion on the Morrison direct order. This makes
more than $5,500 commissions due Plaintiffs.
4. That the evidence requires a finding that
Gindy actively concealed the true state of the orders
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and the mere "deals in progress" from Plaintiffs
to induce them to rely on such representation and
its accompanying, dependent promise of payment
direct with priority of $17,000 to Plaintiffs and that
Plaintiffs are out of pocket $8,000 and interests and
costs on the $12,000 loaned to Freeway Sales at Gindy's inducement.
5. That the legal requirements and the factual
requirements of an action of promissory estoppel
were fully proved and judgment should be given for
the Plaintiffs in the sum of $5,500. Such judgment
would fulfill Professor Vlilliston's analysis of the
duties of a court in this kind of case.
There would seem, however, compelling
reasons of justice for enforcing promises,
where injustice cannot be otherwise avoided,
when they have led the promisee to incur any
substantial detriment on the faith of them,
not only when the promisor intended, but also
when he should reasonably have expected su~h
detriment would be incurred, though he did
not request it as an exchange for his promise.
Williston Contracts, Revised Ed., 1936,
Volume 1, Section 139 p. 502.
Respectfully submitted,
A. LAD RU JENSEN and
RICHARDS, BIRD and
HART
716 Newhouse Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiffs·
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